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The concept of international legal personality is
parasitic upon the concept of real human
personality, which is to say, upon the actual
existence of sentient human beings.
"Personality" (in its strictest sense) signifies the
separate existence of individual human characters
and, indeed, self-consciousness in the possession
of mental and moral qualities. The attribution of
"legal" personality is a metaphor by which nonhuman;
non-conscious
entities
(usually
collectives) are described in the discourse of law
to have mental and moral consciousness.
"International legal personality" applies to those
entities, which international law regards as an
independent personality.
States are the
paradigmatic
example
of this.
Modern
international law developed primarily by viewing
states as individuals, and elaborating the natural
law which ought to apply between them.'
'See e.g., Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi
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The metaphor of legal personality has always
the
foundation
the
remains,
and
been,
international legal system. Hugo Grotius wrote of
a great society of states, maintained for the

mutual

advantage

of all.2

Christian

Wolff

personae morales,3
as
nations
described
associated in a great civitas maxima, just as
individual persons unite into their own particular
politics. 4 Vattel understood nations or states to be
moral persons, with their own will and
understanding, as well as rights and obligations.5
"Because nations are made up of men who are by
nature free and independent.., their nations or
sovereign states must in turn be regarded as free
persons living together in a state of nature."6 The
moral authority of the state derives from the
Naturelle, Appliquds h la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des
Souverains. London. 1758.
2 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in quibus ius Naturae et
Gentium item Juris Publicis praecipua explicantur Revised edition.
Amsterdam. Blaevius. 1646. Prolegomena: "Sed sicut cuiusque civitatis
respiciunt, ita inter civitates aut onnes aut plerasque ex consensus jura
quaedam nasci potuerunt, et nata apparet, quae utilitatem respicerent non
coetuum singulorum, sed magnae illius universitatis."
3 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium methodo scientifca pertractatum. Frankfurt
and Leipzig. 1764. Praefatio.
4Ibid. "Cum gentes in civitatem ipsa natura coegerit, quemadmodumn eidem
convenienter in civitates particulares covierunt singuli."
Le Droitdes Gens, preliminaires §2.
5Vattel,
6
1bid., preliminaires §4 : "Les Nations dtant composees d'hommes
naturellement libres et independans ...les Nations, ou les Etats souverains,
doivent dtre consideres comme autant de personnes libres, qui vivent entr'elles
dans I'dtat de nature."
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natural rights and freedom of the citizens it
represents 7 . This justification of the power of
states in international law, by derivation from the
people that they represent, provides the primary
basis for all treaty law (including the United
Nation Charter, which presumes to speak on
behalf of "We the peoples of the United Nations")."
The strength of this rhetorical device depends
upon perceiving that both law and states exist to
serve the person, which is to say, real persons.
The collective "people" evokes flesh and blood
individuals possessed of hopes, fears, desires,
needs, and a set of rights and duties protected by
the legal system under which they live. 9 Legal
persons, in any given legal system, necessarily
include all the real persons subject to that system.
Often, however, some classes of "fictive persons"
(associations or groups of real persons) are given
collective rights and duties by the governing legal
regime.10
Sometimes animate creatures or
inanimate objects also enjoy a sort of
anthropomorphic personality, as when rocks or
dogs are put on trial for murder or given legal
protection against cruelty and thoughtless
7 Ibid., preliminaires § 5: "la Nation entiere, dont la Volontl commune n'est
que le resultat des volont~s rdunies des Citoiens."
8 Charter ofthe United Nations (1945), Preface.

9 See M.N.S. Sellers, "The Nature and Purpose of Law," University of
BaltimoreLaw Review (2004).
10See e.g., M. Geldart, Legal Personality.Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1924.
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exploitation. 1
International law confers legal
personality on states, giving them rights and
duties in much the same way that real persons
enjoy rights against injuries and assaults, and
duties not to commit them.' 2
The existence of states (as juristic or moral
entities) should not be allowed to obscure the
purposes of international law, which is for the
common good and regulation of real persons 3 .
States and other corporations act, if they act at
all, through and upon real persons. German
theorists sometimes speak disconcertingly, of the
"collective will" (Gesamtwille) of a corporate
body or the state." No one can deny, however,
the culpability of statesmen who violate
international law, or the rights of those that they
15
oppress in violating international protections.
" See e.g., N. Sellers, "Criminal Prosecution of Animals" in XXXV The
Shingle 179 (1972).
12 See e.g., Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle, Appliqus 6 la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des
Souverains. London. 1758. Preface, pp. v-xv, for the analogy between nations
and persons. Vattel cites Christian Wolff for the idea that nations are
"personnes morales" (p.xiv).
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres: in quibus ius Naturae et
Gentium, item Juris Publici praecipua explicantur. (Revised Edition.)
Amsterdam. Blaevius. 1646. Prolegomena, p.4: "Haec vero, quam rudi modi
iam expressimus, societatis custodia, humano intellectui conveniens, fons est
ejus juris, quod proprie tali nomine appellantur."
Savigny is the primary author of this unfortunate tendency.
15Even Jean Bodin, the evangelist of state power, conceded the right of the
people to throw off their oppressors. Bodin Les six livres de la ripublique.
Paris. 1583.
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Some legal systems limit the capacity in which
certain persons, such as minors, may act. This
does not diminish their personality, but only their
ability to act independently from those who care
for their interests.
The term "international law" was coined to
emphasize the personality of states and the power
of governments, to express the collective will of
their subjects. 16 Henry Wheaton articulated this
virtually universal nineteenth-century consensus
when
he described
international
law as
"consisting of those rules of conduct which reason
deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature
of the society existing among independent
nations."17 This passage describes ius inter gentes
(law between nations), rather than ius gentium in
the older sense,"' and much of international law
has come to reflect this statist Way of looking at
things. Human rights law, necessarily, retained a
more direct concern for the real human persons.19
The Charter of the United Nations still accepts
16 Jeremy

Bentham, Morals and Legislation. London. 1823. 11.256. See Percy

E. Corbett. The Growth of World Law. Princeton. Princeton University Press.
1971. p.34, 177-178.
17 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, ed. R.H. Dana. Boston.
Little Brown. 1866. 1.14 [23] (p.20).
18Cf. Richard Zouche, Juris et Judicii Fecialis, sive Juris inter Gentes.
London. 1650.
19See e.g., August Wilhelm Heffier, Das europiiische V6lkerrecht der
Gegenwart. Berlin. 1844. See Wheaton 1.10 [16] p.14 . "This law is applied, not
merely to regulate the mutual relations of states, but also of individuals, so far
as concerns their respective rights and duties."
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states as its primary constituency,2" while also
recognizing the importance of international
human rights and fundamental freedoms,21 which
members must promote and respect.2 2
The role of international legal personality (in
conferring legitimacy upon the power of states in
international
affairs)
has
obscured
the
significance of personality, the purposes of
international
law, and
the legitimacy
of
international institutions. It does this by focusing
on the circumstances in which non-human
entities can achieve juristic personality, rather
than justifying the value of real human personality
in international law. The most famous case on
international law legal personality, Reparationfor
Injuries, concerns the right of non-state
international organizations to raise claims for
injuries before the International Court of
Justice,2 3 The International Court of Justice exists
primarily to adjudicate disputes between states,24
so it is not surprising that jurisprudence on
personality tends to focus on the extent to which
other legal persons resemble states in their ability
to bring international claims. But this should not
20Charterof the United Nations. (1945). Article 4.
21 Ibid. Article 1 (2).
22Ibid. Articles 55 and 56.
23Reparation for Injuries case, ICJ Reports (1949), 179.
24Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice, Article 34 (1): "Only states may
be parties in cases before the Court."
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obscure the central element of legal personality,
which concerns the rights and duties of real
persons.
International legal personality differs from the
artificial legal personality of other legal systems,
not in the nature or in the identity of persons, but
in the mechanisms through which their rights and
duties can be vindicated. Thus, those who deny
individual persons or particular organizations
standing to vindicate their rights in international
tribunals often phrase their objections in terms of
legal personality; when the real issue is if the legal
system did, or should, give a direct cause of action
to a particular person before a particular court.
As in old common law, a woman had legal rights
and duties, but the power to vindicate them rested
entirely in her husband; so, also, do persons and
corporations have rights or duties under
international law, which only their national
government can vindicate in international
tribunals. 2

This does not diminish individual

legal personality, but rather the power to take
legal action, in certain circumstances.
The confusion between personality and standing
may lead to injustice, when the absence of
standing is taken as the absence of enforceable
25 See

e.g., The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Permanent Court of

International Justice, 1924.
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rights. Personality concerns the possession of
Standing concerns the
rights and duties.
vindication of rights and duties. One should not
understand that the absence of standing implies
As the
the absence of rights or personality.
Mavrommatis case clarifies, lacking the power to
act in certain international tribunals does not
negate underlying rights, which others may or
may not raise in defense of one's interests.
Standing is a question of systemic utility and
Personality is a question of
representation.
identity and morality.
The international legal system is warranted (or
not) by the justice and acuity with which it (1)
recognizes, and (2) protects international rights
and duties. The first consideration concerns legal
personality; the second concerns standing. There
is no question that individual human beings, as
well as many sorts of artificial persons, have rights
If they have
and duties under international law.
legal
personality,
duties,
they
have
rights and
because legal personality signifies nothing more
than interests that the community recognizes as
deserving of social protection, or abilities that the
restraint.
to require
community
supposes
International prohibitions against war crimes, for
example, recognize the personality of both the
victims and the perpetrators.

[741
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Some would say that to have personality is to
have the personal power to vindicate one's
rights,26 but this confuses the possession of a right
and the protection of a right. The protector, or
administrator, of a right is a separate concept
from the subject of the right. Much of modern
international law rests on the possibility of
making this distinction.
States in modern
international law claim to act on behalf of (and in
vindication of the rights of) their citizens. If the
citizens do not have rights (and, therefore,
personality),
the state loses the primary
justification for its existence.
The move to deny individual persons their legal
personality is a move to deny them their rights.
Governments wishing to avoid their international
obligations, challenge individual legal personality;
but this are a self-defeating tactic, because the
state's claim to legitimacy, under international
law, rests on the separate and collective
personalities of the persons subject to its rule.
More sophisticated states admit individual
personality, but deny their subjects the separate
capacity to vindicate their rights themselves, as
parents speak for their children, or guardians act
for the mentally impaired.

26 E.g. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th Edition,

Oxford, 2003. pp. 648-50.
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This sort of paternal relationship may be
appropriate in certain circumstances, but it runs
the risk of mistaking the real needs of its subjects.
Just as covertures in the common law contributed
to the subordination of women, so unfettered
power to speak on behalf of the collective may
lead governments into injustice. Those with the
power to make decisions on behalf of others tend
to favor themselves, which is why there is a trend
toward the emancipation of subject classes, giving
them a right to speak for themselves. Persons
without the legal capacity to protect their own
rights have found their rights overlooked more
often than those who could assert their rights
directly (and in person) in the courts.
People prefer to have the capacity to vindicate
their own rights, through access to courts, rather
than leaving the protection of their rights in the
hands of others. State-centered courts, such as
the International Court of Justice, or state-based
institutions, such as the United Nations,
necessarily privilege the interests of governments
over those of their people, because the people
have no direct access to the legal proceedings
undertaken on their behalf. The most vigorous
under
rights
of
individual
enforcement
international law historically takes place in
national courts, which are more accustomed to
considering the status of individuals. Individuals
not only have rights and duties (and, therefore,

[76]
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legal personality under international law), they
also have rights in some courts, including national
courts, like the United States. Individuals who
can vindicate their own rights in court are more
likely to enjoy their rights in practice than those
who cannot.
This brief review of the nature of personality
clarifies the relationship between real persons and
artificial persons in international law.
The
artificial personality of organized groups of
individuals, such as corporations or states, exists
to expand individual rights by allowing individuals
to act collectively. States and other collectives
can defend and enhance the rights of their
members, which is why they deserve the
protection of the law. This should not be taken to
diminish the concurrent personality of real
human individuals.
To do so mistakes the
purpose and justification of law, which is to enrich
the lives of its subjects.
States and international lawyers should wish all
individuals to enjoy their rights in practice,
because the legitimacy of government depends
upon this result.
International law, as a
Benthamite ius inter gentes, rests on the
metaphor that: the state subjects of international
law resemble the individual citizens they rule and
claim to represent. States derive their just powers
from the needs of their subjects. This has leads
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many states to recognize that individual citizens
have legal rights and duties, which is to say, legal
personality. States also assert their own fictive
collective legal personality on the basis of the
persons they serve. To deny the legal personality
of individuals threatens the legal personality of
the state. Scholars and judges, who carelessly do
so, undermine the foundations of public
international law.
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